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THE TREATY PROTECTION OF
RELIGIOUS RIGHTS: U.N. DRAFT
CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION
OF ALL FORMS OF INTOLERANCE
AND OF DISCRIMINATION BASED
ON RELIGION OR BELIEF
John Claydon*
INTRODUCTION
For centuries intolerance and discrimination rooted in re-
ligion have had considerable impact on the course of international
affairs. Indeed, the inception of the present nation-state system in
the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 resulted from a series of religious
wars fought to fill the void created by the breakdown of the mono-
lithic Christianity of international society in the medieval period.
Even a cursory survey of matters considered by the United Nations
in the past twenty-five years demonstrates the extent to which re-
ligious differences continue to contribute to major and minor prob-
lems of world order. Such a list might include the following items:
religious persecution in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania, 1949;
the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan; the treatment of
Buddhists in South Vietnam, 1963; the actions of the People's Re-
public of China in Tibet, 1959-61; the Cyprus problem; the continu-
ing Middle East crisis; and the current situation in Northern Ireland.
In all of these cases the religious factor has operated in varying
degrees either to precipitate or to exacerbate an international crisis;
in most violence has been a component.
In recent years there has been an upsurge in multilateral
treaty-making aimed at providing more adequate international pro-
tection for human rights, but recourse to treaties for the protection
of individuals from religious intolerance and discrimination is not a
new phenomenon. As early as the Peace of Augsburg of 1555 the
principle of religious tolerance achieved unprecedented international
expression.' The Treaty of Osnabruck, part of the Peace of West-
phalia, ensured international protection for religious minorities
* BA., Carleton College, 1967; LL.B., Queen's University, 1970; Assistant Pro-
fessor of Law, Queen's University.
I See 2 D. HILL, A HISTORY OF DIPLOMACY IN THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPNNT
OF EUROPE 479-80 (1906).
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against their sovereigns by granting signatories the right of inter-
vention to enforce its provisions.2 Moreover, it has been argued that
the majority of humanitarian interventions to protect Christians in
the Near and Middle East in the nineteenth century were under-
taken on the basis of treaties.'
The advent of comprehensive international organization in the
League of Nations institutionalized through treaties international
protection of religious minorities. The Versailles peace negotiations
of 1919-20 fostered a system of multilateral treaties dealing with
minorities. Subsequently, other states joined the system through
declarations made to the League Council.4 The availability of the
Permanent Court of International Justice to adjudicate legal dis-
putes concerning obligations contained in these instruments rein-
forced the traditional dispute settlement methods of diplomatic
negotiation, mediation, conciliation, and good offices, as well as the
supervisory task of the League Council, all of which provided al-
ternatives to forcible intervention. Furthermore, the opinions of
the Court served to articulate and clarify the purposes of the trea-
ties on minorities and the reasons for the protection of religion on
the international level. As the Court stated in one case:
[t]he idea underlying the treaties for the protection of minorities is to
secure for certain elements incorporated in a State, the population
of which differs from them in race, language or religion, the possibility
of living peaceably alongside that population and co-operating amicably
with it, while at the same time preserving the characteristics which dis-
tinguish them from the majority, and satisfying the ensuing special
needs.5
While the League system may have achieved these goals for some
groups, it was limited in scope to areas where minority problems
were thought to exist, and the major European powers were not
brought within it. Since Germany was not part of the system, the
German Jew was denied protection. In spite of the defects inherent
in a limited regional approach, the Paris Peace Treaties of 1947
emulated the Versailles system by imposing human rights guarantees
on the defeated states of Bulgaria, Finland, Italy, Hungary, and
2 Id. at 602. See also Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948, 42 Am. J. INT'L
L. 20, 21-22 (1948).
3 Manouchehr Ganji argues that "[T]he practice of humanitarian intervention is
limited to cases based on conventions." M. GANJI, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS 43 (1962) [hereinafter cited as GANJI1]. On the other hand, Professor
Lillich concludes that humanitarian intervention was "clearly established under cus-
tomary international law." Lillich, Intervention to Protect Human Rights, 15 Mc-
GILL L.J. 205, 210 (1969). See also Lillich, Forcible Self-Help by States to Protect
Human Rights, 53 IowA L. Riv. 325, 332-34 (1967).
4 I. CLAUDE, JR., NATIONAL MInORITmS 16 (1955) [hereinafter cited as CIAUDE].
5 Advisory Opinion on Minority Schools in Albania, [19351 P.C.I.J., ser. A/B,
No. 64, at 17.
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Rumania.' Although these treaties formed the basis of generally
unsuccessful United Nations attempts to combat religious persecu-
tion in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania in 1949, 7 they constituted
only a slight variation of the League system and failed to contain
comparable measures of international enforcement and supervision.'
Prior to the establishment of the United Nations, international
concern for the protection of religious rights focused geographically
on the politically unstable states of southern and eastern Europe and
the Near and Middle East, and substantively on intolerance and per-
secution. European power configurations had much to do with re-
stricting protection in this way, but the legal concept of sovereign
equality also played an important role. For instance, not only were
the humanitarian interventions of the nineteenth century under-
taken by the major European powers, but sovereignty was so highly
respected that action was normally taken only when religious oppres-
sion had caused widespread loss of life.' Similarly, religious guaran-
tees in peace treaties were dictated by the victor against the
vanquished, and even then only the weakest of the vanquished were
forced to succumb. The League minority treaties sought to widen the
scope of protection by defining the right of religion to include the
prohibition of religious discrimination in the enjoyment of civil
and political rights.'"
THE UNITED NATIONS
Since its formation the United Nations has worked to extend
the principle of nondiscrimination and to establish the concept of
universal and general institutionalized international protection for
religion. In seeking to achieve these goals" the United Nations has
relied primarily on the treaty.
6 For the texts of the various peace treaties, see 42 Amt. J. INT'L L. 47-142, 179-
278 (Supp. 1948).
7 See The Charter and the Trials of Churchmen, 6 UNITED NATIONS BULLETn,
No. 9, at 416 (May 1, 1949).
8 See CLAUDE, supra note 4, at 125-44.
9 A survey of humanitarian interventions undertaken to protect religious minori-
ties is found in GANJI, supra note 3, at 22-38.
10 CLAUDE, supra note 4, at 17-20.
11 The basic human rights jurisdiction of the United Nations is set out in the
U.N. CHARTER. The Preamble reaffirms "faith in fundamental human rights, in the
dignity and worth of the human person . . . ." U.N. CHARTER, Preamble. A purpose
of the United Nations is the promotion and encouragement of "respect for human
rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, lan-
guage, or religion . . . ." Id. art. 1, para. 3. Respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms on a non-discriminatory basis is a condition necessary for "peaceful and
friendly relations among nations ... ." Id. art. 55. Members are bound to "take joint
and separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of the
purposes set forth in Article 55." Id. art. 56.
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The initiatives of the United Nations in the human rights area
since 1945 represent efforts to achieve the general goals formulated in
the Charter' 2 by defining the rights to be protected and by establish-
ing international procedures for implementation. The 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights prohibits, inter alia, discrimination
on the basis of religion in the areas of legal process, universal and
equal suffrage, the right to work, the right to adequate housing, and
the right to life.18 Additionally, for our purposes, the Declaration pro-
claims a right to religion, which includes the freedom to change
religion and the freedom to manifest religion or belief either individu-
ally or collectively in teaching, practice, worship, and observance.
Although technically not a binding instrument, the Declaration has
become increasingly authoritative because of its widespread accep-
tance. 4
Subsequent efforts have ranged from protection of the right to
life in the Genocide Convention to the expansion of the right to
employment and its protection under the aegis of the International
Labor Organization. 5 The 1966 Covenants on Civil and Political
Rights and Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights have clarified the
Universal Declaration and have provided remedial procedures. The
Covenants recognize a wider range of rights than any other inter-
national agreement. 6 Continuing manifestations of discrimination
and intolerance based on race resulted in an International Conven-
tion on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination. 7
Finally, reference should be made to parallel regional arrangements
for the protection of human rights in Europe and the inter-American
system.' 8
12 Id.
13 G. A. Res. 217A, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) (arts. 3, 8-11, 21, 23, 25).
14 McDougal & Reisman, Rhodesia and the United Nations: The Lawfulness of
International Concern, 62 Am. J. INT'L L. 1, 12 (1968); Sohn, The Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights, 8 J. INT"L COMM'N JURISTS 17, 26 (1967).
15 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(1948), 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (1951) [hereinafter referred to as Genocide Convention],
proscribes a range of "acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a
national, ethnical, racial or religious group . . . ." (Art. II). The text of the Conven-
tion Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation (1958)
may be found in INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION: CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMEN-
DATIONs, 1919-1966 at 969 (1966). See generally Human Rights: A Compilation of
International Instruments of the United Nations, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.32/4 (1967).
16 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N.
GAOR Supp. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 49,
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
17 G.A. Res. 2106A, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. 14, at 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966).
This convention, unlike the 1966 Covenants, is now in force. Multilateral Treaties in
respect of which the Secretary-General Performs Depositary Functions 71, U.N. Doc.
ST/LEG/SER.D/4 (1971).
18 [European] Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The
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In light of this history of international concern, it is not sur-
prising that the United Nations should seek to enact a convention to
clarify the right to religious practice and to provide safeguards for
its protection. However, the lack of action by the General Assembly
and the protracted nature of its deliberations is surprising, even al-
lowing for the considerable amount of time devoted by the Third
Committee to both the Racial Discrimination Convention and the
two Covenants."9 After more than a decade of activity the Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Dis-
crimination Based on Religion or Belief has not yet progressed be-
yond draft form.20 Before analyzing some of the more important
provisions of the draft convention, this article will discuss briefly
its background and provide a general overview of its contents.
BACKGROUND OF DRAFT CONVENTION
The origin of the convention is found in two resolutions of the
General Assembly. The first of these is Resolution 1510 of 1960, in
which the General Assembly condemned all manifestations and prac-
tices of racial, religious, and national hatred in the political, economic,
social, educational, and cultural spheres of society as violations of
the Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.2 Ini-
tially, efforts were directed toward the adoption of a convention
aimed at eliminating racial discrimination. The second resolution
occurred in 1962, when the General Assembly requested that the
Economic and Social Council prepare a draft declaration and draft
convention on the elimination of religious intolerance.22 This resolu-
tion was transmitted by the Council to the Commission on Human
Rights and the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities.23 The General Assembly made its eigh-
teenth session the deadline (1963) for the preparation of a declara-
text may be found in 45 Am. J. INT'L L. 24 (Supp. 1951). See also the 1961 European
Social Charter, Europ. T.S. No. 35 (1961); American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man, [1948] U.N.Y.B. oN HumAN RIGHTS 44. See also The American
Convention on Human Rights (San Jose Pact), signed in 1969, the text of which
may be found in 9 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 99 (1970); Thomas & Thomas, Human
Rights and the Organization of American States, 12 SANTA CLARA LAW. 319 (1972).
19 The Third Committee devoted almost its entire twentieth session in 1965 to
the Racial Discrimination Convention. See 20 U.N. GAOR, Third Comm. 1288-1374,
U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR. (1966). A similar pattern developed at the twenty-first session
with respect to the Covenants. See 21 U.N. GAOR, Third Comm. 1375-1464, Doc.
A/C.3/SR. (1967).
20 See generally Note by the Secretary-General: Elimination of All Forms of
Religious Intolerance, U.N. Doc. A/7930 (1970) (hereinafter cited as Note by the
Secretary-General].
21 G.A. Res. 1510, 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 21, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960).
22 G.A. Res. 1781, 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. 17, at 33, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as G.A. Res. 17811.
23 Note by the Secretary-General, supra note 20, at 3, para. 3.
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tion and its twentieth session (1965)24 the deadline for a convention,
in the hope that the convention would be open for signature and
ratification by 1968, the International Year for Human Rights.
Prior to the Resolution of 1960, the Sub-Commission conducted
an investigation and published a "Study of Discrimination in the
Matter of Religious Rights and Practices" in which it recommended
draft principles for consideration by the Commission.25 The Com-
mission neglected to consider these principles, instead it requested in
1963 that the Sub-Commission prepare a draft declaration.26 The
Commission, "owing to lack of time," was unable to adopt this dec-
laration. Therefore in 1964 the Sub-Commission's preliminary draft
declaration was forwarded to the Economic and Social Council along
with the report of the working group set up by the Commission. 7
In the same year the Economic and Social Council referred these
documents to the General Assembly.28 The General Assembly did not
consider the preliminary draft declaration; rather, it requested the
Economic and Social Council to invite the Commission to have both
the draft convention and the draft declaration ready for submission
to the Assembly at its twenty-first session.29 At that time, both the
Commission and the Sub-Commission were involved in preparing the
convention. The Commission, however, has not considered any text
of the declaration since 1965.
A draft convention prepared by the Sub-Commission in 1965
was transmitted by the Commission in 1967 to the Economic and
Social Council to be forwarded to the General Assembly." The
General Assembly's deadline had already passed and the Commission
was unable to complete its task, again "owing to lack of time." The
Sub-Commission's recommended provisions concerning implementa-
tion were not considered, but were sent to the Council and trans-
mitted to the General Assembly in the "hope that the General
Assembly will decide upon suitable measures of implementation.'
24 G.A. Res. 1781, supra note 22.
25 A. KRISHNASWAMI, STUDY OF DISCRIMINATION IN THE MATTER OF RELIGIOUS
RIGHTS AND PRACTICES, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/Sub.2/200/Rev.1 (1960).
26 See 22 U.N. GAOR, Third Comm., 1468th meeting at 113-114, U.N. Doc. A/C.
3/SR.1486 (1967), the statement by Mr. Schreiber of the Secretariat to the Third
Committee. The text of the draft declaration formulated by the Sub-Commission is
contained in Annex I to Note by the Secretary-General, supra note 20.
27 Note by the Secretary-General, supra note 20, at 4, para. 5. For the report
of the working group, id. at Annex II.
28 ECOSOC Res. 1015C, 37 U.N. ECOSOC, Supp. 1, at 17, U.N. Doc. E/3970
(1964).
29 G.A. Res. 2020, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. 14, at 37, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as G.A. Res. 2020).
30 ECOSOC Res. 1233, 42 U.N. ECOSOC, Supp. 1, at 13, U.N. Doc. E/4393
(1967).
1 Id. at 14.
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Thus, at its twenty-second session the General Assembly had before
it part of the draft convention but no draft declaration which had
been considered by the Commission.
At the twenty-second session of the General Assembly, its Third
Committee devoted twenty-nine meetings to consideration of the
convention,"2 but "owing to its heavy agenda and lack of time" the
Committee adopted only a new title, a preamble, and a first article.83
In Resolution 2295 the General Assembly decided to accord priority
to the convention at its twenty-third session. 4 In December, 1968
the General Assembly decided to further postpone consideration of
the convention and to give it high priority at its twenty-fourth
session. 5 There were additional postponements in 1969 and 1970,
again on the recommendation of the Third Committee and because
of lack of time." Finally, the General Assembly on December 18,




The draft convention may be divided into two parts: (1) a
preamble and twelve articles containing substantive provisions
adopted by the Commission on Human Rights, and (2) eighteen
articles dealing with implementation proposed by the Sub-Commis-
sion on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. 8
The draft preamble consists mainly of general principles expressing
the desirability of eliminating religious discrimination and intoler-
ance. The preamble also refers to other instruments which proclaim
the principle of nondiscrimination and the right to freedom of
thought, conscience, religion, and belief. Finally, the preamble notes
the continuing existence of manifestations of intolerance and affirms
the resolve of the states parties "to adopt all necessary measures for
eliminating speedily such intolerance in all its forms and manifesta-
tions and to prevent and combat discrimination on the ground of
religion or belief."
32 22 U.N. GAOR, Third Comm., Meetings 1486-1514, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/SR.
1486-1514 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Third Comm. by meeting and page, with speaker
indicated as appropriate].
33 G.A. Res. 2295, 22 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 38, U.N. Doc. A/6716 (1967).
34 Id. at 39.
35 23 U.N. GAOR, Annexes, Agenda Item No. 54, U.N. Doc. A/7452 (1968).
36 24 U.N. GAOR, Annexes, Agenda Item No. 52, U.N. Doc. A/7886 (1969);
25 U.N. GAOR, Annexes, Agenda Item No. 54, U.N. Doc. A/8255 (1970).
37 G.A. Res. 2844 (XXVI), Agenda Items Nos. 50, 51, and 60, U.N. Doc. A/RES/
2844 (XXVI) (1972).
38 For the text of the draft convention, see Note by the Secretary-General, supra
note 20, at Annexes III, V-VI.
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Article I defines the terms "religion or belief," "discrimination,"
and "religious intolerance" and provides that neither the establish-
ment of a religion nor the recognition of a religion or belief by a
state nor the separation of Church from State shall by itself be con-
sidered intolerance or discrimination. In Article II, discrimination
and intolerance are condemned and the parties promise to "promote
and implement policies" designed to ensure tolerance, to protect
freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or belief, and to eliminate
discrimination. In Article III the "right to freedom of thought, con-
science, religion, or belief" is defined as a personal right to choose
to adhere or not to adhere to any religion or belief. The definition also
includes freedom of manifestation and expression concerning religion
or belief, i.e. freedom to worship, teach, and disseminate; freedom
to establish charitable and educational institutions relating to a reli-
gion or belief; freedom to organize "local, regional, national, and
international associations" in connection with religion or belief; and
freedom from compulsion to take a religious oath.
In Article IV states undertake to permit parents to raise their
children according to the religion or belief of their choice. When a
child is raised by someone other than a parent, the wishes of the
parent are to be respected, although the best interests of the child
are considered paramount. Article V stipulates that states shall ensure
freedom to exercise all human rights without discrimination on the
ground of religion or belief. Article VI is the only provision in the
Convention in which states pledge themselves to "adopt immediate
and effective measures" and consists of the obligation to combat prej-
udice and promote tolerance, mainly through education. Article VII
complements Articles II and V by obligating states to take measures
to eliminate discrimination and intolerance, including the enactment
and abrogation of laws.
Articles VIII-X guarantee equal protection of the law in the
exercise of the freedoms enumerated in the previous articles. Equal
protection, as defined in Article IX, includes protection against pro-
motion of or incitement to religious intolerance or discrimination.
The final substantive provisions restrict the exercise of all the rights
contained in the convention, except the freedom to adhere or not to
adhere to any religion or belief. Even this right is circumscribed when
the exercise of it involves "activities aimed at prejudicing national
security, friendly relations between nations or the purposes and
principles of the United Nations" (Article XI).'9 Other freedoms are
additionally subject to "such limitations as are necessary to protect
public safety, order, health or morals, or the individual rights and
89 Id. art. XI.
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freedoms of others, or the general welfare in a democratic society"
(Article XII).40
The implementation measures contained in Articles XIII-XXX
establish a procedural system, modeled on the Racial Discrimination
Convention,4 ' that comprises: 1) a regular reporting obligation (to
the Economic and Social Council) with respect to legislative or other
measures which states have adopted to give effect to the substantive
provisions of the convention (Article XIII); 2) the establishment
of a Good Offices and Conciliation Committee to settle disputes be-
tween states concerning the application and interpretation of the
convention; 3) a provision for publication of the report of the Com-
mittee in the event that an "amicable solution" cannot be reached
(Articles XIV-XXV); 4) the right of individual or group petition
to the Committee through the Secretary General, provided that the
state against which a claim is lodged recognizes the competence of
the Committee to receive such petitions (Article XXVI); 5) recourse
by the Committee to the International Court of Justice for an ad-
visory opinion on any legal question concerning a matter with which
it is dealing (Article XXVII); and 6) the capacity of states parties
to submit any dispute arising out of the interpretation or application
of the convention to the International Court of Justice, even if the
matter is within the competence of the Committee (Article XXX).
COMMENTS ON THE CONVENTION
If the convention is ultimately adopted and a dispute arises with
respect to interpretation of its provisions, the decision-maker is
likely to invoke the aid of travaux prgparatoires to carry out his
task.4" Normally the starting point for interpretation will be the text
of the convention, and the subsequent practices under it may also
be relevant to the decision. Of course, since the convention has not
yet been adopted there has been no practice, nor is there a definitive
text. However, a draft convention does exist and the Third Com-
mittee has made some changes in the original version of the title,
preamble, and first and sixth articles. Furthermore, the general
debate in the Third Committee provides a guideline to other areas
of controversy concerning the convention which are likely to engender
problems in future deliberations. The following section of this article
will discuss briefly some of the more important areas of controversy
40 Id. art. XII.
41 See note 17, supra.
42 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27, at
16-17 (1969) (arts. 31-32). For a broader conception of the relevance of preparatory
work, see M. McDouoGA, H. LASSWELI & J. MILLER, THE INTERPRETATION OF AGREE-
MENTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1967).
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and evaluate the convention generally. The concluding remarks willfocus on the limitations of the treaty approach to the protection of
religion.
The Issue of Priority: Declaration or Convention
In addition to affecting the process for negotiation for thisparticular convention, this decision on priority may also influence
the future course of multilateral agreement-making for the inter-
national practice of human rights in general. This decision on prior-ity will affect not only the process of negotiation for this particular
convention, but also the course of multilateral agreement-making
for the international protection of human rights.48 In this case, how-
ever, sound considerations favor prior adoption of a declaration.
First, a declaration would provide a consensual foundation for
a subsequent convention. The continuing widespread existence of
religious intolerance and discrimination strongly suggests that states
disagree on the nature of religious rights deemed worthy of protection
and the extent of protection desirable. Religious discrimination,
unlike racial discrimination, is not universally condemned; indeed,
there may be little genuine consensus at all. A prior declaration,
therefore, might provide a point of departure for the convention in
the context of widely divergent national policies and attitudes toward
religion, and also, for some states, the optimum extent of obligation
which they are willing to assume. Consequently, a declaration wouldhave wider acceptability than a convention, with the result that some
states unwilling to adhere to a convention might, nevertheless, votefor the declaration. Since a declaration is consensual, it has the po-tential to progress along the spectrum of obligation, either on the
basis of its origin in a quasi-legislative organ of the United Nations
or as customary international law, to the point of authoritativeness
now enjoyed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Secondly, United Nations practice normally involves the formu-lation of a declaration before the adoption of a convention. Thispractice reflects a comprehensive approach to the protection of hu-
man rights, in which the convention and declaration are interrelated
in a logical manner. This method seems to have worked well in thepast, and one would expect any departure to be based on sound con-
siderations in favor of change.
Finally, there is the explicit view of the General Assembly, ex-pressed in Resolutions 178i and 2020,"4 that priority should be
accorded a declaration.
43 See note 14, supra.
44 G.A. Res. 1781, supra note 22, and G.A. Res. 2020, supra note 29.
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These are persuasive arguments and the debates in the Third
Committee demonstrated that a significant number of states were
influenced by them.4" Moreover, it was not seriously argued that a
convention should precede a declaration as a rule of general policy.
Arguments against following the usual practice centered rather on
the circumstances surrounding this particular convention. For in-
stance, it was suggested that there was no need for a declaration to
provide an "ideological basis" for the convention, since the principle
of religious tolerance was neither revolutionary nor innovative."
However, the verbal confrontations during the debate, especially
between Israel and the Arab states and India and Pakistan, reflected
the extent to which ideological factors had intruded, and served as a
reminder of continued intolerance, manifested both domestically and
internationally. In fact, the only serious argument for adopting a
convention first was based on expediency. The Committee had before
it a convention sanctioned in part by the Commission on Human
Rights and a preliminary declaration considered only by the Sub-
Commission; some states thought it still possible to complete the
convention in time for the International Year for Human Rights in
1968 if the declaration were placed in abeyance.
The most unfortunate result of this controversy was not the
cavalier manner in which the Committee treated policies favoring
the prior adoption of a convention, but the method by which the
decision was reached. The Official Records of the Third Committee
show that its 1497th meeting "was suspended at 4:50 p.m. and
resumed at 5:15 p.m.," at which time the Chairman suggested that
if there were no opposition, the Committee should proceed to dis-
cussion of the draft convention.47 This suggestion was approved and
the Committee went on to consider the convention. In spite of the
previous opposition of many states to this ordering of priorities, no
vote was taken. Nevertheless, the controversy had not ended. At
the conclusion of the Committee's deliberations on the convention,
two draft resolutions were submitted respectively according priority
to the declaration and the convention at the next session.48 The Cey-
lonese draft resolution according priority to the declaration noted
the Committee had only completed consideration of the preamble
and first article. The final meeting adjourned without resolving the
issue.
Although the public nature of deliberations in an international
"parliamentary" area tends to encourage wasteful ideological squab-
45 Third Comm., supra note 32, at Meetings 1486-97.
46 Id. 1494th Meeting at 160, Guatemala.
47 Id. 1497th Meeting at 176.
48 U.N. Doc. A/C.3/L.1492 and U.N. Doc. A/C.3/L.1487/Rev.2.
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bling, private multilateral diplomacy may result in illusory agree-
ment. However, in this instance, valid reasons motivated those states
which urged that priority be given to a declaration. The subsequent
debates and the short period of time required to produce a wholesale
turnabout in position on the part of many states lend support to the
conclusion that it is very unlikely that consensus was reached on any-
thing other than the desire to get on with the convention. This deci-
sion does not represent the victory of private compromise and
conciliation over obstructive propaganda in the open forum. Rather,it is a postponement of the search for general consensus to a time
when its discovery and articulation will be superfluous. Rather than
expediting the convention, bypassing the declaration stage may pro-
long the process of negotiation. While it is too early to evaluate thelong-term impact of this decision on the deliberations, it is possible
that the chances for conclusion and adoption of a convention in the
near future have been seriously impeded.
Alterations in the Draft Convention by the Third Committee
Before analyzing the preamble and the draft convention as a
whole, the Third Committee considered objections to the only spe-
cific example of religious prejudice in the convention, the reference to
anti-Semitism in Article VI. The United States, the United Kingdom,
and Israel, among others, thought the inclusion of anti-Semitismjustifiable as the classic example of religious intolerance, comparable
to the specific condemnation of apartheid in the Racial Discrimina-
tion Convention. 9 Not surprisingly, the Arab states, joined by some
of the Soviet bloc, argued that anti-Semitism represented political
and racial, rather than religious, prejudice.' o This argument does
not augur well for fulfillment of the primary purpose of the conven-
tion, for it provides an escape-clause which encompasses virtually
every form of intolerance and oppression. For instance, the argu-
ment permits the claim that oppressive treatment of Hindus inPakistan and Moslems in India, Catholics in Northern Ireland, and
Buddhists in South-Vietnam should be regarded as "political" in
nature and consequently outside the scope of the convention." The
49 Third Comm., supra note 32, 1489th Meeting at 131, United States; id. 1490thMeeting at 137, United Kingdom; id. 1487th Meeting at 121, Israel.
9O Id. 1486th Meeting at 119, United Arab Republic; id., 1493rd Meeting at 151,
Kuwait; id. 1488th Meeting at 127, Czechoslovakia; id. 1490th Meeting at 133,Yugoslavia. Syria, however, argued that anti-Semitism should not be mentioned be-
cause, although constituting religious intolerance and discrimination, it was in theprocess of disappearing, at least in Europe. Id. 1491st Meeting at 142.51 Even discrimination can be circumscribed with the same argument, although
its broader basis of protection, articulated both in this convention and other instru-
ments, undermines both the persuasiveness of the argument and its range of applica-tion. But can it be argued that anti-Semitism or anti-Catholicism have "cultural" or
"historical" origins and are not, therefore, distinctions based on "race, colour, sex,
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same argument could be made to exclude the "racial" characteristic
of anti-Semitism from the protection provided by the Racial Dis-
crimination Convention. While it may be difficult to establish with
certainty the primary basis of any specific example of intolerance,
this type of argument serves only to defeat the goal of international
protection of human rights. It may not be necessary to list in this
convention all known forms of religious oppression, nor to include
anti-Semitism. It is certainly necessary to apply conscientiously the
instrument in light of its purposes, and to formulate criteria for
identifying discrimination and intolerance based on religion.
In any event, a majority of the states favored the Republic of
China's contention that, since the convention was of world-wide
significance, including any specific example of religious intolerance
would alter its nature and impact and might impede its acceptabil-
ity.52 The Committee, by a vote of 87-2 with 7 abstentions, decided
not to mention any specific example of intolerance.
58 Thus, future
interpreters faced with a claim involving anti-Semitism must be pre-
pared to make careful use of the travaux pr~paratoires and to adopt
sufficiently broad definitions of the phrases ultimately used-"dis-
crimination on the ground of religion or belief" and "religious
intolerance"-to fulfill the purposes of the convention.
4
The original title formulated by the Commission on Human
Rights was also a subject of controversy. The title, "International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Religious Intoler-
ance" was disputed because it granted special protection to religion,
above other beliefs,5 and because of the vagueness of the term
"intolerance.1 56 The first objection does not withstand close scrutiny,
for the clauses of the draft convention employ the term "religion or
belief," and Article I defines that expression as including "theistic,
non-theistic, and atheistic beliefs." Neither the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights nor the Covenant on Political and Civil Rights
attempts definition, although they refer to "religion or belief.1
57
These instruments also condemn discrimination based only on "reli-
language, religion, political or other opinions, national or social origin, property, birth
or other status," Universal Declaration of Human Rights, note 13, supra, art. 2? A
similar problem arises with respect to the definition of "religious group" under Art. II
of the Genocide Convention, note 15, supra.
52 Third Comm., supra note 32, 1489th Meeting at 129.
53 Id. 1497th Meeting at 178.
54 A clear example of the potential dangers surrounding the use of travaux
priparatoires is provided by the Chilean statement that "[tihe Committee had decided
not to mention anti-Semitism, on the ground that the discrimination in that case was
racial and not religious .... " Id. 1501st Meeting at 196.
55 Id. 1498th Meeting at 179, Italy; id. 1488th Meeting at 126, Czechoslovakia.
56 Id. 1498th Meeting at 179-80, U.S.S.R.
57 See notes 16, 51, supra, at art. 18.
19721
SANTA CLARA LAWYER
gion." 8 Arguably, therefore, the present convention broadens the
content of religion-related rights. Consequently, the contention of theSoviet Union and East European states that intolerance was his-
torically manifested particularly toward those who had no religion,59
and therefore, "religion" ought not receive preferential protection,
was not supported by the text as a whole. The objection to the title
emphasized form rather than substance.
Since, there was little opposition to a title change that would
emphasize both intolerance and discrimination, by a vote of 89-0
with 1 abstention, the Committee adopted the title "International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and ofDiscrimination based on Religion or Belief."'0 The definitional pro-
visions and Article IV make it clear that the term "belief" was notintended to encompass political beliefs,"' but this distinction may bedifficult to apply. On the other hand, the term "intolerance" is not
clarified in the convention and, as will be pointed out later, may
indeed cause problems.
The greatest amount of time spent on an integral part of theConvention was devoted to the preamble: eight of the twenty-nine
meetings of the Third Committee.6 2 Much of this time was spent on
a Soviet proposal to include in the preamble a guarantee that "reli-gion would not serve as a pretext for intervention in the domestic
affairs of a State and would not be an obstacle to the holy war
against colonialism."6 This proposal was generally supported by theEast-European and Afro-Asian states and opposed by the Western
states.64 For example, the United States argued that the principle
of freedom of conscience would not impede the elimination of
colonialism, itself a struggle for freedom of conscience; the danger
was that authoritarian regimes might exploit the proposed restric-
tion.65 Israel contended that all specific references to religion should
be excluded. 6
The claim"7 that the Western religions had interfered in African
58 Id. art. 2.
59 Third Comm., supra note 32, 1487th Meeting at 120, U.S.S.R.; id. 1493rdMeeting at 153-54, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic.60 Third Comm., supra note 32, 1505th Meeting at 213.61 A Syrian effort to replace the words "theistic, non-theistic, and atheistic" in
art. 1(a) by the words "metaphysical beliefs of an all-inclusive nature," U.N. Doc.A/C.3/L.1484/Corr.1, was defeated by a vote of 49-2 with 48 abstentions. Third
Comm., 1510th Meeting at 238.
62 Meetings 1498 to 1506 were devoted to the preamble.
63 Third Comm., 1499th Meeting at 184.
64 Id. Meetings 1501-04 generally.
65 Id. 1501st Meeting at 193-94.
66 Id. 1502nd Meeting at 202.
67 U.N. Doc. ST/TAO/HR/25.
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domestic affairs6" was countered with the argument that the Soviet
proposal would prohibit a progressive role for religion in interna-
tional affairs. It might, for instance, prevent churchmen from sup-
porting the fund for political prisoners in South Africa.
9 However,
the provisions in Article XI, which subordinate freedoms guaranteed
in the convention to national security, friendly relations between
nations, and the purposes and principles of the United Nations, con-
stitute a more fundamental objection to the Soviet proposal. Article
XII provides further limitations, permitting a state party to take
whatever measures are necessary to "protect public safety, order,
health or morals, or the individual rights and freedoms of others, or
the general welfare in a democratic society." Ample scope is thus
provided for the prevention of interference in domestic affairs and
for the curtailment of colonialism.
It is probably more accurate to say that the real "pretexts"
are found in these two articles because of their restrictions on the
exercise of rights under the convention. The Third Committee
adopted the gist of the Soviet proposal by stipulating in its preamble
that states parties note that "manifestations of religion or belief had
served and are still serving as a means or as an instrument of foreign
interference in the internal affairs of other States and peoples" and
are convinced that "the right to freedom of religion or belief should
not be abused so as to impede any measures aimed at the elimination
of colonialism and racialism."
7 This may undermine the accepta-
bility of the convention by displacing the compromise preamble
adopted by the Commission on Human Rights.
71
The accusation that the convention was biased toward the West,
provided at least part of the impetus for the changes made in the
title and preamble, and also prompted the controversy in the general
debate over timing for fulfillment of specific commitments. Thus,
a number of developing states took the position that the obligations
in the convention were premature and some initial discrimination
was necessary in order to effect social and economic progress.
72 How-
ever, the obligations in question are not stringent. The only require-
ment for immediate and effective action by the states is found in
B8 Third Comm., supra note 32, 1501st Meeting, at 195, United Arab Republic.
This claim was based on U.N. Doc. ST/TAO/HR/25, para. 123, which is the report
of the Seminar on Human Rights in Developing Countries, held at Dakar in 
1966.
In the General Debate a similar objection, premised on the role played by missionaries
in colonization, was made to the guarantee in art. 111(2) (g) of the freedom to organize
"international assodations." See, e.g., Third Comm., 1491st Meeting at 
142, Syria;
id. 1487th Meeting at 120, U.S.S.R.
69 Third Comm. supra note 32, 1501st Meeting, at 196. United Kingdom.
70 See Note by the Secretary-General, supra note 20, Annex III, at 7-8.
71 Id., at 1-2.
72 See, e.g., Third Comm., supra note 32, 1486th Meeting, at 116, India.
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Article VI. It only imposes a duty to adopt vague educational andinformational methods to combat prejudice. With respect to the moreimportant provisions, the commitments are merely to "ensure"(Articles V, IX, X) or "undertake to ensure" (Articles III, VIII)
their fulfillment. Moreover, an additional draft article submitted byJamaica stipulated that no provision of the convention should be
"interpreted as to require or to authorize any derogation from anyprovision in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
or the International Covenant on Economic, Social and CulturalRights."78 Under the latter instrument a state is obligated merely
to realize the guaranteed economic and social rights "progressively"
and to the extent possible with its "available resources." 4 If adopted,
the Jamaican article would eliminate unequivocally the claim that
certain states do not have the capabilities of meeting their obliga-
tions under the convention.
The Problem of "Intolerance"
By adopting Article I without defining "religious intolerance,"
the Committee has exacerbated the problem which surfaced in thedebate over the inclusion of a reference to anti-Semitism. That debateindicated that the absence of criteria to determine the meaning of
"religion or belief" might impede the elimination of discrimination
or intolerance grounded in these factors. The problem is perhaps not
so acute with respect to discrimination because of the protection
accorded in this and other instruments against nonreligious dis-
crimination. But equivalent protection is not available elsewhere with
respect to intolerance, which has traditionally been connected with
religion.75 By failing to define the term "intolerance" other than
tautologically as "intolerance in matters of religion or belief, 76 the
Committee has complicated the problem.
As the title clearly indicates, the convention encompasses bothintolerance and discrimination, and this distinction is adhered to
throughout its substantive provisions. Article I(b) provides a work-
able and detailed formula77 for determining "discrimination," but
unfortunately intolerance has not been accorded the same clarity.
73 Note by the Secretary-General, supra note 20, at Annex IV.
74 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res.2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (art. 2).75 See the argument of France on this point. Third Comm., supra note 32,
1498th Meeting at 180.76 Note by the Secretary-General, supra note 20, at 8, para. 20(c).
77 "The expression 'discrimination on the ground of religion or belief' shall meanany distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on religion or belief whichhas the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment orexercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political,
economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life."
[Vol. 12
RELIGIOUS RIGHTS PROTECTION
This confusion gives rise to several questions. Does any violation of
the extensive "right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion or
belief" delineated in Article III amount to intolerance? If this ques-
tion is answered affirmatively, then compulsion to take an oath of a
religious nature would be proscribed on this basis. The real difficulty
is found in the reference to intolerance elsewhere in the convention,
e.g. Articles II, VI, and IX; compulsion to take a religious oath would
fall under Article III in any event. When do states contravene the
obligation in Article IX to ensure protection of the law against "pro-
motion of or incitement to religious intolerance"? This obligation is
meaningful only if such protection is directed toward the freedoms
set out in Article III, yet this nexus is not made explicit in the con-
vention. s While it may be undesirable to limit protection against
intolerance to the rights guaranteed in Article III, the present for-
mulation presents the more serious danger that the term may be
devoid of any content whatsoever.
A Bulgarian amendment would have defined intolerance broadly
as "manifestations of intolerance in matters of religion or belief
reflected in actions contrary to the provisions of 
this convention. ' 79
This definition arguably would have included discrimination as a
component of intolerance, thereby confusing the matter unnecessarily
because of the clear meaning of discrimination. It also would have
created a circulus inextricabilis by defining intolerance in terms of
the provisions of the convention, rather than by providing a means
whereby the provisions could be interpreted in light of the definition.
However, the proposed amendment stimulated little serious discus-
sion and was easily defeated." No other attempts were made to
rectify the terminological obscurities inherent in the nondefinition
of religious intolerance. If in the application of the convention a
dispute should arise on this point, the interpretative process will face
the task of sorting out what is actually a drafting defect.
Enforcement Measures
The Third Committee debates on the issue of enforcement are
likely to reflect past arguments over enforcement procedures in other
conventions. Thus, the Afro-Asian and East European states strongly
opposed extending the implementation measures of the Racial Dis-
'78 Article VII(2), whereby states undertake "not to pursue any policy or enact
or retain laws or regulations restricting or impeding freedom of conscience, religion 
or
belief or the free and open exercise thereof, nor discriminate against any person 
. . . "
may be interpreted as supporting this connection as may be a prearmbular reference
to the proclamation of the principle of non-discrimination and the right to freedom 
of
thought, conscience, religion and belief" in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.
See Note by the Secretary-General, supra note 20.
79 U.N. Doc. A/C3/L.1482.
80 Third Comm., supra note 32, 1511th Meeting at 241.
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crimination Convention to the 1966 Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights.8
There is a basic difference in the enforcement powers granted
under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and Convention on
Racial Discrimination. The Human Rights Committee set up under
the 1966 Covenant can only receive and study reports from individual
states and transmit its reports and general comments to the states
parties and to the Economic and Social Council.82 The same provision
obligates states parties to submit to the Committee reports on mea-
sures giving effect to the rights in the Covenant. A report is required
within one year after the Covenant enters into force and thereafter at
the request of the Committee. If the Committee is to receive, con-
sider, and act on communications claiming that a state party is in
violation of the Covenant, both the state complaining and the state
against which a complaint is brought must make declarations recog-
nizing its competence."3 The competence of the Committee to receive
petitions from individuals is prescribed in an Optional Protocol to
the Covenant. On the other hand, under the Racial Discrimination
Convention states are required to report regularly (every two years)
to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 4
and are subject to the competence of that Committee to consider and
act on claims alleging violation of the Convention.85 A declarationby the participating state endows this Committee with the competence
to receive petitions from individuals, a and any party may submit adispute to the International Court of Justice for decision.87
It has been noted that the preliminary draft on implementation
measures placed before the Third Committee copied substantially
the Racial Discrimination model, and that these measures, formu-lated by the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities, had not been considered by the Commis-
sion on Human Rights.88 Statements made in the general debate
concerning implementation measures indicate that the Third Com-
mittee is prepared to start from the beginning, partly because theCommission on Human Rights failed to take any action on this
matter. As a result, New Zealand, although basically in agreement
81 Schwelb, Civil and Political Rights: the International Measures of Imple-
mentation, 62 Am. J. INT'L L. 827, 833-34 (1968).82 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21
U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (art. 40 at 57).
83 Id. art. 41, at 57.
84 G.A. Res. 2106A, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. 14, at 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966)
(art. 9).
85 Id. art. 11.
86 Id. art. 14.
87 Id. art. 22.
88 See notes 41 and 28-31, and accompanying text, supra.
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with the Racial Discrimination model, suggested the establishment of
a working group to study implementation measures.89 A small group
of Afro-Asian states proposed an alternative model based largely on
the 1966 Covenant."
The crux of the debate over implementation was whether to
adopt strong measures similar to those of the Racial Discrimination
model, or less strict requirements like those in the 1966 Covenant.
As might be expected, the Western states led the drive for strict
measures, emphasizing the similarity between discrimination based
on race and on religion, and arguing that with strong implementation
clauses, this convention would supplement and strengthen the Racial
Discrimination Convention." It was also pointed out that these two
areas of human rights were "specific" in contrast to the "wide
variety" of rights protected in the 1966 Covenant.92 The adoption of
less stringent measures for this convention would, therefore, consti-
tute the establishment of a hierarchy of race over religion, with
religious discrimination consequently regarded the less reprehensi-
ble.98 However, it was argued in favor of the Covenant model that
Afro-Asian states should not be expected to adhere to the strict
measures desired by the Western states.94 Additionally, the Cove-
nant's measures were viewed as more compatible with the principles
of national sovereignty and independence.9 A variation on this
position pointed to the Covenant method as a compromise solution
that would better ensure widespread acceptance." Finally, variations
on both sides opposed the proliferation of implementation systems
that would result if each convention had its own separate system, and
suggested that the approach adopted here should facilitate transition
to a single enforcement procedure in the human rights area. How-
ever, there was disagreement on whether the Covenant or the Racial
Discrimination model would best serve the goal of uniform enforce-
ment machinery, although the former was favored by most advocates
of the single system. 7
Judging from the general debate, it appears that when the
Committee finally undertakes the task of adopting implementation
measures it will be difficult to choose a system acceptable to all.
89 U.N. Doc. A/C.3/L.1458; Third Comm., supra note 32, 1487th Meeting at 119;
id. 1491st Meeting at 140.
00 U.N. Doc. A/C.3/L.1456.
91 Third Comm., supra note 32, 1490th Meeting at 137, United Kingdom.
92 Id. 1491st Meeting at 140, New Zealand; id. 1494th Meeting at 162, Ireland.
93 Id. 1491st Meeting at 140, New Zealand.
94 Id. 1496th Meeting at 173, Nigeria.
95 Id. 1492nd Meeting at 146, Romania.
96 Id. 1493rd Meeting at 152-53, Pakistan.
97 Id. 1487th Meeting at 120, Turkey; id. 1489th Meeting at 132, Poland;
id. 1492nd Meeting at 146, Romania; contra, 1495th Meeting at 167, Ghana.
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Whatever the motivations behind the positions assumed by various
states may be it is clear that some form of compromise will be neces-
sary to reconcile all parties to the debate. For this reason the chances
of adopting the Racial Discrimination model appear slim. It is also
apparent that the General Assembly has indeed established a hier-
archy of protecting race over religion. The Assembly adopted theRacial Discrimination Convention first, and this priority has con-
tinued throughout the activities of the General Assembly. Irrespective
of its merits, this ordering of priorities is strengthened by general
uncertainty regarding the components of religious intolerance anddiscrimination in contrast to the relative ease with which it is
thought discrimination based on race can be identified. This hier-
archy will almost certainly affect the acceptability of measures of
implementation.
CONCLUSION
The negotiations and actions of the Third Committee lead to
the conclusion that the final product will leave much to be desired,
especially when compared with the Racial Discrimination Conven-
tion. The convention will probably suffer from weaker implementa-
tion measures, a much greater potential for derogation from the
rights guaranteed, and a substantial amount of terminological con-fusion. Concessions on implementation, the timing of obligations,
and the capacity to derogate seem necessary in order to ensure a
minimum degree of acceptance of the convention. Whether the fail-
ure to perceive infringement of religious rights as a pressing matter
of international concern, reflected to some extent in the delays whichhave plagued the process of negotiation, is the major factor under-lying the type of instrument likely to be produced, remains an openquestion. Certainly other factors grounded in general ideological
divisions have contributed to the problem. The cumulative effect ofthis controversy has been reluctance on the part of many states to
assume stringent obligations in the absence of any consensus con-
cerning ultimate goals and the best methods to achieve them. Viewedfrom this perspective, the decision to adopt the convention beforeformulating a declaration may have a prejudicial impact on the
result which will outweigh any potential time-saving benefits. It is,
of course, possible that no greater consensus could have been reachedin any event. Some of the shortcomings in the convention may con-
stitute the minimum concessions required for acceptability.
Regardless of the nature of the convention that will ultimately
emerge from the General Assembly, it is important to place the
agreement-making task in the context of the general limitations on
the treaty approach to protecting religious rights. Where discrimina-
tion and intolerance based on religion are deeply rooted in the social
and psychological fabric of many hundreds of years, even the strictest
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and most perfectly drafted convention will not solve all problems."
In the absence of genuine efforts at communication among conflicting
groups, the legislation risks futility. Moreover, any convention must
balance all legitimate claims. In this respect, a convention aimed at
protecting religious rights must reconcile permitting the dissemina-
tion and practice of religion with preventing religious prejudice, in-
tolerance, and discrimination. The application of this balancing
process to a concrete situation demonstrates the difficulty encoun-
tered when a line must be drawn between permissible and impermis-
sible activity. For example, at least part of the intolerance and dis-
crimination in Northern Ireland today stems from past recognition
of the right to disseminate and practice religion, manifested to some
extent in a system of education which has served to accentuate
religious differences and thereby to indirectly lend support to reli-
gious conflict.
Finally, in view of the weaknesses of this convention, the limita-
tions inherent in any treaty approach, and the failure of the United
Nations to provide effective remedies, it is relevant to inquire briefly
whether religious oppression may be rectified through recourse to
forcible unilateral or collective noninstitutionalized intervention-a
modern version of the "humanitarian intervention" practiced in the
nineteenth century. Scholars are divided as to whether this remedy
is available in light of the general prohibition on the use of force
contained in the Charter of the United Nations."9 However, there ap-
pears to be increasing readiness to recognize the continuing permis-
sibility of this remedy in the absence of effective international or
regional alternatives, provided that adequate safeguards are available
to prevent its abuse.'0° The oppression which an intervention for
humanitarian purposes seeks to rectify usually involves loss of life
or at least serious danger to life requiring immediate response. The
convention approach, therefore, does not provide an alternative to
intervention, but rather a concurrent method of dealing with human
rights violations in the absence of emergency. Perhaps the answer
on the international level is the establishment of a dual system: the
creation of a United Nations humanitarian force that could remedy
acts or threats of severe oppression by taking immediate and extraor-
dinary action, supplemented by a strong convention that would
have greater long-term impact. However, given present political
realities, the foreseeable future holds little promise for either.
98 See Palley, Constitutional Devices in Multi-Racial and Multi-Religious Societies,
19 N. IR. L.Q. 377 (1968).
99 For a survey of the literature dealing with the impact of the Charter on the
legitimacy of humanitarian intervention, see Lillich, Intervention to Protect Human
Rights, 15 McGLL L.J. 205, 210-12 (1969).
100 For some suggested criteria to test the legitimacy of interventions to protect
human rights, see Moore, The Control of Foreign Intervention in Internal Conflict,
9 VA. J. INT'L L. 205, 263-64 (1969).
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